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1. INTRODUCTION
This year, the Dutch courts ruled two times in the AkzoNobel
case. Two times, the courts denied the requests of activist
shareholders of AkzoNobel to convene an extraordinary general
meeting (EGM) to dismiss AkzoNobel’s chairman of the super-
visory board. The reason for the shareholders’ request was the
decision of AkzoNobel’s board not to engage in negotiations
with PPG Industries (PPG) concerning its takeover bid
on AkzoNobel. The main arguments of the courts were based on
the idea that the decision on a takeover bid is part of the
company’s strategy, which belongs to the domain of the
board, and that the shareholders failed to show a reasonable
interest for convening an EGM. Therefore, it seems that the
courts in the AkzoNobel case imposed significant restrictions to
shareholder rights relating to the general meeting, in favour of
the autonomy of the board and the interests of other
stakeholders.
These decisions raise the question: are the decisions in the
AkzoNobel case consistent with earlier Dutch case law? And are
these decisions compatible with the Shareholder Rights
Directive?1 This article discusses both decisions in the AkzoNobel
case. Afterwards, the broader Dutch legal framework is explained.
In particular, other Dutch case law is discussed concerning the
restriction of shareholder rights to add items to the agenda of the
general meeting or to convene a general meeting, such as the
Boskalis/Fugro case and the Cryo-Save case. Finally, the com-
patibility of the Dutch legal framework with the Shareholder
Rights Directive is analysed.
2. FACTS OF THE AKZONOBEL CASE
On 2 March 2017, PPG Industries (PPG), an American paint and
coatings company, made an unsolicited takeover bid for its Dutch
rival, AkzoNobel. AkzoNobel’s supervisory board and management
board refused to negotiate with PPG, however, even after the latter
upped its bid twice. They argued that PPG’s bid was not in the
interest of AkzoNobel’s stakeholders, including its shareholders, and
that AkzoNobel was in a strong position as a stand-alone company.
In addition, the board argued that the bid undervalued AkzoNobel
and that there were some serious concerns, for example of competi-
tion law.2
Some shareholders, such as the activist shareholder Elliott
International L.P. (‘Elliott’), did not agree with the board’s approach
and requested the supervisory board to convene an EGM in order to
vote on the dismissal of AkzoNobel’s chairman, Antony Burgmans,
who had been a vehement critic of the takeover bid by PPG.
The board denied this request, however, arguing that the EGM
was not in AkzoNobel’s best interest and was not in accordance
with legal requirements.3 Following this decision, Elliott filed for
inquiry proceedings (‘enquêteprocedure’) concerning the decisions
of the board concerning the PPG takeover bid. In the context of this
procedure, Elliott asked the court to take ‘immediate measures’
(‘onmiddellijke voorzieningen’) and order AkzoNobel to call an EGM
to vote on Mr Burgmans’ position.
3. THE FIRST DECISION IN THE AKZONOBEL CASE
In its decision of 29 May 2017, the Enterprise Chamber
rejected the request for immediate measures, finding no
* This article is partly based on two previous blogposts on the AkzoNobel case (one of them also co-authored by Thom Wetzer), which were published earlier on Corporate
Finance Lab and Oxford Business Law Blog. E-mail: tom.vos@kuleuven.be.
1 Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies, OJ L 184/17.
2 Court of Amsterdam (Enterprise Chamber), 29 May 2017, Elliott International, L.P. v. Akzo Nobel N.V., ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:1965, paras 2.13–2.14 (hereinafter ‘Elliott v.
Akzo Nobel (I)’).
3 Elliott v. Akzo Nobel (I), para. 2.46.
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serious grounds to question the proper management of the
company.4
Firstly, the Enterprise Chamber decided that the supervisory
board and the management board did not violate the duty of care
(‘zorgvuldigheidsnorm’) by not engaging in negotiations with PPG,
as there is no general principle in Dutch law that obliges a company
to negotiate with potential bidders.5 The Enterprise Chamber
affirmed that the management board, under supervision of the
supervisory board, is competent for determining the company’s
strategy.6 In principle, the board is accountable towards share-
holders for its strategy, but it does not necessarily has to consult the
shareholders before deciding on a matter falling under its compe-
tence. The Chamber considered that the boards acted in an
informed manner, after meeting multiple times and after consulting
with several expert advisers and stakeholders.
Secondly, the Enterprise Chamber did not consider the board’s
refusal to convene an EGM a sufficient reason to doubt the proper
management of the company either. Hence, it declined to order any
immediate measures in the inquiry proceedings. The Enterprise
Chamber considered that the request to convene an EGM was not
only motivated by the desire to oust Burgmans as a chairman, but
also partly by the desire of the shareholders to change the strategy of
the company, which belongs to the competence of the board.7 The
decision of the Enterprise Chamber also relied on a procedural
argument: a shareholder request to convene a general meeting
should be filed with the court in summary proceedings (‘voorzie-
ningenrechter’) under Articles 2:110 and 2:111 of the Dutch Civil
Code, and not with the Enterprise Chamber in an inquiry
proceeding.8
After the decision of the Enterprise Chamber, on 1 June 2017,
PPG retracted its takeover bid,9 because the ‘put up or shut up’
deadline had passed. This implies that it could not launch a takeover
bid for at least six months, i.e. until 1 December 2017.10
4. THE DEBATE ON THE AGENDA OF THE EGM OF 8 SEPTEMBER 2017
Despite the fact that PPG had retracted its takeover bid after the
decision of the Enterprise Chamber, Elliott had lost all trust in
AkzoNobel’s chairman and still wanted to dismiss him. On 7 July
2017, it filed for summary proceedings with the tribunal of
Amsterdam (‘voorzieningenrechter’) in order to convene an EGM
with the goal of dismissing AkzoNobel’s chairman.
AkzoNobel responded by announcing on 25 July 2017 that it
would convene an EGM on 8 September 2017, but without adding
the dismissal of its chairman to the agenda. The only agenda items
for the announced EGM were an explanation by AkzoNobel’s board
of its decisions concerning the PPG bid, and the approval of
AkzoNobel’s new CEO, Thierry Vanlancker, because AkzoNobel’s
old CEO, Ton Büchner, stepped down due to health reasons.
The announcement for the EGM of 8 September 2017 was made
forty-five days before the EGM, which is in accordance with the
statutory period of at least forty-two stipulated in Article 2:115 of
the Dutch Civil Code. However, shareholders could not add items to
the agenda of this EGM, as this should be done sixty days before a
general meeting (Article 2:114a of the Dutch Civil Code). This
enraged Elliott and other shareholders, who argued that this violated
the rights of shareholders.
The impossibility to add items to the agenda is a logical conse-
quence of Dutch law, however, which stipulates a deadline for
adding items to the agenda of a general meeting that is earlier than
the deadline for convening a general meeting. Nevertheless, this
might be surprising for company lawyers outside the Netherlands.
In Belgium, for example, the situation is precisely the reverse: the
deadline for adding items to the agenda is twenty-two days before
the general meeting (Article 533ter of the Belgian Companies Code),
while the deadline for convening a general meeting in a listed
company is thirty days (Article 533§2 of the Belgian Companies
Code). This ensures that shareholders who own more than 3% of
the share capital always have some time in between to request to
add items to the agenda.
After this, Elliott’s only hope to oust AkzoNobel’s chair was the
summary proceedings to convene a general meeting before the
tribunal of Amsterdam.
5. THE SECOND DECISION IN THE AKZONOBEL CASE
In the summary proceedings, Elliott joined forces with another
shareholder, York, and argued that the conditions under Dutch law
4 Court of Amsterdam (Enterprise Chamber), 29 May 2017, Elliott International, L.P. v. Akzo Nobel N.V., ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2017:1965. For a discussion of the first decision (in
Dutch), see F. G. K. Overkleeft, AkzoNobel, PPG en de Ondernemingskamer, 2017 Maanblad voor Ondernemingsrecht 135 (2017); M. J. G. C. Raaijmakers, AkzoNobel.
Bestuursautonomie in beurs-NV: behoud stand-alone-strategie en afwijzing overnamevoorstel, 2017 Ars Aequi 713 (2017); Frank M. Peters & Floor Eikelboom, De strijd over het
agenderingsrecht tussen Elliott en Akzo, 7156 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 496 (2017).
5 Elliott v. Akzo Nobel (I), paras 3.14–3.16 and para. 3.24.
6 Ibid., para. 3.9. This was also decided earlier in the ABN AMRO case and the ASMI case: Dutch Supreme Court, 13 July 2007, ABN AMRO, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7972; Dutch
Supreme Court, 9 July 2010, ASMI, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976.
7 Elliott v. Akzo Nobel (I), 3.28.
8 Ibid., 3.36. Peters and Eikelboom are very critical about this procedural argument and argue that the competence of the ‘voorzieningenrechter’ is not exclusive: Peters &
Eikelboom, supra n. 4, at 499–500.
9 PPG, PPG Announces Decision to Withdraw Proposal and Not Pursue Offer for AkzoNobel (1 June 2017), http://corporate.ppg.com/Media/Newsroom/2017/06-01-2017-PPG-
announces-decision-to-withdraw-pr.
10 Art. 2(2) Decree Public Takeover Bids (Besluit van 12 Sept. 2007, houdende implementatie van richtlijn nr. 2004/25/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van de
Europese Unie van 21 Apr. 2004 betreffende het openbaar overnamebod (PbEU L 142) en houdende modernisering van de regels met betrekking tot het openbaar overnamebod
(Besluit openbare biedingen Wft)), nr. BWBR0022511.
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for a shareholder’s request to convene a general meeting were
fulfilled: they owned more than 10% of the share capital, they had
previously asked the supervisory board in writing to convene the
general meeting, and neither of the boards had responded with the
necessary actions to hold a general meeting (Article 2:110 of the
Dutch Civil Code). However, AkzoNobel and its supervisory board
argued that these shareholders did not have a ‘reasonable interest’
(‘redelijk belang’) in convening the general meeting, as required by
Article 2:111 of the Dutch Civil Code.
It is the latter concept that is the central element in the dispute.
The supervisory board and AkzoNobel stated that the dismissal of
its chairman was disproportionate, harmful and not in the best
interest of AkzoNobel. They argued that the shareholders should
wait before convening an EGM until after the general meeting of 8
September 2017, where the supervisory board will explain its beha-
viour concerning the PPG bid.11
Elliott and York, on the other hand, stated that the legislative
intent behind the requirement of a ‘reasonable interest’ was solely to
avoid bullying and that a rejection of a shareholder’s request to
convene an EGM can only be justified in exceptional
circumstances.12 They argued that they have a reasonable interest in
convening an EGM, because they (and a large number of other
shareholders) have lost all trust in AkzoNobel’s chairman, and that
the explanation given by the board will not be able to alleviate their
concerns.
In a decision of 10 August 2017, the tribunal of Amsterdam
rejected Elliott and York’s interpretation of the concept of ‘reason-
able interest’, however.13 It considered again that a company’s
strategy is the domain of the management board, under supervision
of the supervisory board. According to the court, the principle of
reasonableness and fairness implies that if the power to dismiss
directors is used by shareholders as an instrument for punishing
them for a certain policy, directors should be given the possibility to
explain themselves during a general meeting before the one
requested.14 The court decided that the request of Elliott and York
was premature and that they should wait for the explanation given
by the board during the general meeting of 8 September 2017. Elliott
and York can file for a new request afterwards.
6. UNDERSTANDING THE DECISION FROM A DUTCH PERSPECTIVE
While this decision might come as a surprise for company lawyers
outside the Netherlands, it is not surprising from a Dutch perspec-
tive, as it is consistent with the Dutch stakeholder model and with
previous case law in the Netherlands.
For example, in the Boskalis/Fugro case,15 Boskalis B.V. was a
20% shareholder in Fugro N.V. Boskalis requested to add an item to
the agenda of the general meeting (in accordance with Article 2:114a
of the Dutch Civil Code): a shareholder vote on a recommendation
to the management board and the supervisory board of Fugro to
dismantle one of the anti-takeover arrangements of Fugro. The
board declined to add this item to the agenda as a voting item, and
only added it as a discussion item. The president of the court of Den
Haag in summary proceedings rejected Boskalis’ challenge to the
board decision. The court held that the decision fell under the
board’s competence to set the company’s strategy and that a share-
holder vote would infringe on this competence.16 This decision has
been criticized by some authors, however, who argue that share-
holders can make a recommendation to the board for matters not
falling under their competence, and that the decision of the court is
not in conformity with the Shareholder Rights Directive (see further
below).
In another case, the Cryo-Save case,17 the right of shareholders
to convene a general meeting was also severely restricted. In this
case, Amar, a controlling shareholder in Cryo-Save, was not satisfied
with the company’s strategy and requested the board of Cryo-Save
to convene an EGM in order to appoint himself as the new CEO of
the company. However, Cryo-Save’s board invoked the 180-day
‘response time’ from the Dutch Corporate Governance Code18 to
postpone the EGM.
The Enterprise Chamber, ruling on a request for immediate
measures in an inquiry proceeding, held that the board could invoke
the response time and that a response time invoked by the board
can only be ignored if sufficiently serious reasons are present.19
According to the Enterprise Chamber, this follows from the prin-
ciple of ‘reasonableness and fairness’ in Article 2:8 of the Dutch
Civil Code.20 This is somewhat surprising, because the Corporate
Governance Code is only a non-binding self-regulatory document,
11 Tribunal of Amsterdam (Voorzieningenrechter), 10 Aug. 2017, Elliott International, L.P. v. Akzo Nobel N.V., ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2017:5845, para. 4.6 (hereinafer ‘Elliott v. Akzo
Nobel (II)’).
12 Elliott v. Akzo Nobel (II), para. 3.2.
13 Ibid., para. 4.5 and following.
14 Ibid., para. 4.7.
15 Tribunal of The Hague (Voorzieningenrechter), 17 Mar. 2015, Boskalis Holding B.V. v. Fugro N.V., ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:3452. For a discussion of this case (in Dutch), see
Frank M. Peters & Floor Eikelboom, De strijd over het agenderingsrecht tussen Boskalis en Fugro, 7061 Weekblad voor Privaatrecht, Notariaat en Registratie 407 (2015) (very
critical of the decision); T. C. A. Dijkhuizen, Boskalis/Fugro: het agenderingsrecht verder uitgehold?, Bedrijfsjuridische Berichten 1 (2016).
16 Paras 4.7–4.9.
17 Court of Amsterdam (Enterprise Chamber), 6 Sept. 2013, Cryo-Save Group N.V. v. Amar, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2013:2836. For a discussion of this case (in Dutch), see Rien Abma,
Rechtskarakter responstijd, 16 Ondernemingsrecht 117 (2013); Harm-Jan De Kluiver, Reactie op commentaar bij uitspraak Cryo-Save Group/Salveo Holding, 17
Ondernemingsrecht 127 (2013); H. A. van Hulst & M. R. W. Boer, Cryo-Save – de responstijd in de praktijk, 12 Vennootschap & Onderneming 219 (2013); M. J. G. C.
Raaijmakers, Een dreigende vijandige overname van een onbeschermde beurs-NV, 2014 Ars Aequi 197 (2014).
18 Currently best practice provision nr. 4.1.6 and nr. 4.1.7 of the Dutch Corporate Governance Code.
19 Para. 3.11.
20 Paras 3.9 and 3.10.
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and because the 180-day response time contradicts the statutory
deadlines to add items to the agenda or to convene a general
meeting.21
Several authors have criticized the Cryo-Save decision, arguing
that the right of shareholders to convene a general meeting can only
be deviated from in exceptional circumstances, such as in case of
abuse.22 This is the opposite rule as the one stated in Cryo-Save,
where the Enterprise Chamber held that the response time should
always be honoured, except in extreme circumstances. Other
authors have defended the Cryo-Save decision.23 They favour a large
role for the Enterprise Chamber in interpreting the principles of
reasonableness and fairness and they view the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code as an expression of the general legal opinion that
shapes the principles of reasonableness and fairness.24
In conclusion, the decisions in the AkzoNobel case are consistent
with earlier decisions in the Boskalis/Fugro case and the Cryo-Save
case. It seems generally accepted in Dutch company law that the
rights of shareholders to convene a general meeting or to add points
to the agenda of the meeting can be restricted when they are used to
change a company’s strategy, as the board has a large autonomy to
decide on the strategy.
Restriction of shareholder rights and a large autonomy for the
board are also consistent with the Dutch stakeholder model, i.e. the
idea that the board should not only pursue the interests of share-
holders, but rather of all relevant stakeholders. An expression of the
Dutch stakeholder model can be found in the ABN AMRO case,
where the Dutch Supreme Court decided that directors should
consider ‘the interests of all stakeholders, including those of
shareholders’.25 In addition, in the first decision in the AkzoNobel
case, the Enterprise Chamber applied the stakeholder model and
came to the conclusion that the board could decide not to support a
takeover bid, even if this bid is preferred by a majority of the
shareholders of the target company, and even if the bid would create
more value for shareholders than a stand-alone strategy could.26
Finally, the Dutch Corporate Governance Code confirms the sta-
keholder model by stating that the directors of a company have to
consider the interests of all stakeholders in pursuing the goal of
long-term value creation for the company (principle 1.1).
The Netherlands is quite exceptional in making this very explicit
choice for the stakeholder model. For example, Belgium seems to
have chosen for a ‘(long-term) shareholder model’.27 The Belgian
Court of Cassation has ruled that ‘the interest of a company is
determined by the collective profit interests of the company’s current
and future shareholders’.28 Consistent with this view of the com-
pany’s interest (and to my best knowledge), there is no case law in
Belgium that imposes substantive restrictions to the right of share-
holders to request to convene a general meeting or add items to the
agenda of the meeting. In contrast to the Netherlands, there is also
no explicit statutory requirement in Belgian law that shareholders
should have a ‘legitimate interest’ in convening the general meeting
or adding items to the agenda (cfr. Articles 532 and 533ter of the
Belgian Companies Code), but only a rule from general company
law that shareholder rights (like other rights) cannot be abused.
7. COMPATIBILITY WITH THE SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE
This article is not the place to engage in the elaborate debate on
whether corporate law should follow the shareholder model or the
stakeholder model. However, this article does discuss whether the
Dutch case law inspired by the stakeholder idea is still compliant
with the Shareholder Rights Directive.
Article 6(1) of this directive stipulates:
Member States shall ensure that shareholders, acting individually
or collectively: (a) have the right to put items on the agenda of the
general meeting, provided that each such item is accompanied by a
justification or a draft resolution to be adopted in the general
meeting; and (b) have the right to table draft resolutions for items
included or to be included on the agenda of a general meeting.
Member States may provide that the right referred to in point (a)
may be exercised only in relation to the annual general meeting,
provided that shareholders, acting individually or collectively,
have the right to call, or to require the company to call, a general
meeting which is not an annual general meeting with an agenda
including at least all the items requested by those shareholders.
In short, this means that Member States need to ensure that share-
holders have the right to put items on the agenda of the general
meeting, but that Member States have the possibility to restrict this
right to the annual general meeting, provided that shareholders have
the right to call a general meeting with an agenda including at least
all the items requested by them.
21 Abma is very critical of this aspect of the Enterprise Chamber’s decision, especially considering the fact that the 180-day response time is not widely accepted by institutional
investors, according to him: Abma, supra n. 17, at 117, para. 9.
22 Abma, supra n. 17, at 117; van Hulst & Boer, supra n. 17, at 219, 221–222.
23 E.g. Kluiver, supra n. 17, at 127.
24 The latter was also confirmed in: Dutch Supreme Court, 9 July 2010, ASMI, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BM0976, para. 4.4.2 sub (iii); and Dutch Supreme Court, 13 July 2007, ABN
AMRO, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7972, para. 4.4.
25 Dutch Supreme Court, 13 July 2007, ABN AMRO, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7972, para. 4.5. The original quote is: ‘ook hier geldt dat het bestuur bij de vervulling van zijn bij wet of
statuten opgedragen taken het belang van de vennootschap en de daaraan verbonden onderneming behoort voorop te stellen en de belangen van alle betrokkenen, waaronder die
van de aandeelhouders, bij zijn besluitvorming in aanmerking behoort te nemen’.
26 Elliott v. Akzo Nobel (I), para. 3.34.
27 Arguing in favour of this view: Alain François, Het vennootschapsbelang in het Belgische vennootschapsrecht: inhoud en grondslagen (Intersentia 1999).
28 Belgian Supreme Court, 28 Nov. 2013, 2014 Tijdschrift voor Rechtspersoon en Vennootschap 286, 287. The original quote is: ‘Het belang van een vennootschap wordt bepaald
door het collectief winstbelang van haar huidige en toekomstige aandeelhouders.’
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This provision from the Shareholder Rights Directive might be
problematic for Dutch law. For example in the AkzoNobel case,
Elliott and York had neither of these options: they could neither add
items to the agenda of the general meeting, because the deadline of
sixty days had already passed, nor convene an EGM, because the
court did not consider the requirement of ‘legitimate interest’ ful-
filled. The central question is thus whether the Shareholder Rights
Directive prohibits that Member States create such hurdles for
shareholders to convene a general meeting or add items to the
agenda.
Article 6 only explicitly guarantees the right to add items to the
agenda of a general meeting. The text of the article does not contain
a possibility for imposing additional substantive hurdles for exer-
cising shareholder rights, such as the Dutch case law seems to have
done. Article 3 only allows Member States to strengthen shareholder
rights, not to restrict them. When the Dutch legislator
implemented29 the Shareholder Rights Directive, the previously
existing condition of a ‘legitimate interest’ for adding items to the
agenda of the general meeting was dropped, because this was con-
sidered impermissible under the directive.30
Based on these facts, Peters and Eikelboom have argued that
imposing additional requirements is not allowed under the
Shareholder Rights Directive and that the principles of reasonable-
ness and fairness have to be interpreted in conformity with this
directive.31 The only possible exception to the rights granted by the
Shareholder Rights Directive, is the doctrine of ‘abuse of EU law’.
This doctrine requires both an objective element (a violation of the
purpose of the rules) and a subjective element (an intention to
obtain an undue advantage),32 which is a much stricter standard
than the one under the present Dutch case law.
In addition, Peters and Eikelboom argued that, even though the
right to convene a general meeting is not explicitly protected by the
Shareholder Rights Directive, Article 6 of the directive also applies
to this right if it is combined with a request to add an item to the
agenda and if this agenda item cannot be postponed to a subsequent
general meeting.33 However, this last argument does not seem to
have a basis in the text of the directive. Hence, it seems that the
Shareholder Rights Directive does not necessarily invalidate the case
law discussed above: the decisions in the Cryo-Save case and in the
AkzoNobel case concerned the right to convene a general meeting,
which is not directly protected by the Shareholder Rights Directive,
unlike the right to add items to the agenda. In addition, the
Boskalis/Fugro case related to an agenda item that fell outside the
competence of the general meeting. It seems likely that the
Shareholder Rights Directive only intended to guarantee the rights
of shareholders to add items to the agenda that are within the
competence of the general meeting.
However, from Article 6 of the Shareholder Rights Directive
follows that the case law in Cryo-Save and AkzoNobel (which
concerned the right to convene a general meeting) cannot simply be
extended to the right to add items to the agenda, as this would add
an impermissible substantive hurdle to the exercise of a right
guaranteed by the Shareholder Rights Directive. This means that
invoking the response time stipulated in the Dutch Corporate
Governance Code (as was done in the Cryo-Save case) should in
principle not be allowed when it concerns a request to add an item
to the agenda, as the Code contradicts the Shareholder Rights
Directive on this point.34
In addition, there is the issue that the deadline under Dutch
corporate law for adding items to the agenda (sixty days – Article
2:114a Dutch Civil Code) is longer than the minimal period for
convening a general meeting (forty-two days – Article 2:115 Dutch
Civil Code), which robbed shareholders of the possibility of adding
items to the general meeting in the AkzoNobel case. Article 6(3) of
the Shareholder Rights Directive grants Member States the freedom
to set a deadline for adding items to the agenda. However, the
rationale of the deadline was to enable other shareholders to receive
or have access to the revised agenda or the proposed resolutions
ahead of the general meeting.35 By setting the deadline earlier than
when the agenda for the general meeting is even published, the
Dutch legislator ignored the rationale behind Article 6(3). Hence, it
can be argued that this takes away the ‘effet utile’ of Article 6 of the
Shareholder Rights Directive, especially considering the fact that
shareholders are unable to request to convene an EGM either under
the present Dutch case law. Taken together, this almost completely
eliminates the possibility for shareholders to influence the general
meeting, as became clear in the AkzoNobel case.
In conclusion, an argument can be made that even though Dutch
law is in conformity with the text of Article 6 of the Shareholder
Rights Directive, it violates the purpose of this article. It is unclear,
29 Law of 30 June 2010, ‘tot wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet op het financieel toezicht ter uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 2007/36/EG van het Europees
Parlement en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 11 juli 2007 betreffende de uitoefening van bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders in beursgenoteerde vennootschappen (PbEU
L 184)’, nr. 257.
30 Explanatory Memorandum, ‘Wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet op het financieel toezicht ter uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 2007/36/EG van het Europees
Parlement en de Raad van de Europese Unie van 11 juli 2007 betreffende de uitoefening van bepaalde rechten van aandeelhouders in beursgenoteerde vennootschappen (PbEU
L 184)’, Parliamentary Document nr. 31746/3.
31 Peters & Eikelboom, supra n. 4, at 501.
32 See e.g. CJEU, Case C-155/13 of 13 Mar. 2014, SICES, ECLI:EU:C:2014:145, paras 30–33; Peters & Eikelboom, supra n. 4, at 501.
33 Peters & Eikelboom, supra n. 4, at 502.
34 See also Abma, supra n. 17, at 117, para. 11.
35 See the text of the original commission proposal (COM(2005) 685 final): Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the exercise of voting rights
by shareholders of companies having their registered office in a Member State and whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2004/
109/EC, 5 Jan. 2006.
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however, whether this will have any practical impact on the rights of
shareholders in the Netherlands. In any case, the argument of
conformity with the Shareholder Rights Directive was not consid-
ered in either decision of the AkzoNobel case.
8. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AKZONOBEL CASE AFTER THE COURT
DECISIONS
After Elliott bit the dust for the second time with the Dutch courts,
it concluded a standstill agreement with AkzoNobel, where it agreed
to suspend all ongoing litigation for three months.36 This agreement
was mainly aimed at the ongoing inquiry proceedings, which were
meant to go to trial on 20 September 2017, but were cancelled at the
request of both Elliott and AkzoNobel. Elliott also agreed to support
the nomination of the new CEO, Thierry Vanlancker, the separation
of the Specialty Chemicals department proposed by AkzoNobel, and
the two new directors that were nominated for the supervisory
board. In return, AkzoNobel agreed to consult with its shareholders,
including Elliott, to nominate a third director for its supervisory
board.
On 8 September 2017, AkzoNobel held an EGM where
Thierry Vanlancker was formally appointed as the new CEO of
AkzoNobel. On the same day, however, AkzoNobel also
announced a profit warning, stating that it would not be able to
achieve the profit increase that it announced earlier. In addition,
the current CFO of AkzoNobel, Maëlys Castella, announced that
she would step down for health reasons.37 Anthony Burgmans,
AkzoNobel’s current chairman of the supervisory board, had
already announced earlier that he would step down in April 2018,
when his mandate would end, ‘absent exceptional
circumstances’.38 The most important question now, of course, is
whether PPG will attempt to make another bid after 1 December
2017, when the statutory prohibition to do so will end. Some
commentators seem to believe that this is a realistic option, while
others believe that there is too much ‘bad blood’ between PPG
and AkzoNobel.39
Even without Burgmans as a chairman of the supervisory board
of AkzoNobel, PPG still faces an uphill battle, as AkzoNobel can rely
on an anti-takeover arrangement dating from 1926. In this year, a
foundation that can only be governed by AkzoNobel supervisory
board members, was set up and was granted forty-eight priority
shares in AkzoNobel. Articles 25 and 32 of the articles of association
of AkzoNobel40 give these priority shares the right to make binding
nominations to respectively the supervisory and management
boards. The Foundation Akzo Nobel has confirmed that it will only
make use of this right in exceptional circumstances.41 An amend-
ment to Dutch law in 1928 allowed such binding nominations to be
abolished by a two thirds majority of shareholders,42 but
AkzoNobel’s arrangement was grandfathered, and it is the only
example of such a structure to remain in place today. This means
that the boards of AkzoNobel still possesses a powerful anti-take-
over defence if PPG would launch a hostile takeover bid, making it
essentially impossible to acquire control over AkzoNobel without
the board’s permission.
9. CONCLUSION
The decisions in the AkzoNobel case provide an excellent example
of the far-reaching consequences of the Dutch choice for the sta-
keholder model. Both decisions consider the decision on a takeover
bid as part of the company’s strategy, which belongs to the domain
of the management board, under supervision of the supervisory
board. Shareholders are denied the right to convene an EGM or add
items to the agenda, if this right is used to influence the company’s
strategy, for example by proposing to dismiss one of the company’s
directors.
These decisions seem to follow a trend in Dutch corporate law to
reinforce the autonomy of company boards. As noted above, how-
ever, this might be considered as a violation of the Shareholder
Rights Directive: the right to add items to the agenda is guaranteed
by this directive without any additional substantive requirements
(save in case of abuse of EU law), while Dutch case law does seem to
impose additional requirements that allow the board to reject such
requests.
Symbolic for this trend of more board autonomy is also the
proposal by the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs, Henk Kamp,
to give boards of Dutch companies one year of ‘reflection time’
when they receive an unsolicited takeover bid.43 Whether this
trend is a good thing is up for debate, and this article is not the
place to settle this debate. Still, it is clear that Dutch law goes
further in this trend than many other European countries
(including Belgium) and that it is probably the most ardent sup-
porter of the ‘stakeholder model’ in company law. The decisions in
the AkzoNobel case nicely illustrate this fact.
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